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I. CONSTITUTIONAL DEBT LIMITATIONS
In Painter v. West,' the South Carolina Supreme Court de-
clared Act No. 1077 of the 1972 Acts of the General Assembly2
unconstitutional. The court's decision has significance not only
because of the amount of money involved, an initial bond issue
of five million dollars, but also because of the decision's effect on
the "special fund" doctrine. Many state constitutions purport to
limit the power of state and local governments to incur indebted-
ness.' Nineteenth century constitutional drafters believed that
inflexible standards would curtail irresponsible debt-incurring
activities of the type witnessed during the 1840's and 1850's. It
was assumed that the debt limits, as established, were high
enough to satisfy any future requirements.' The South Carolina
constitution reflects this nineteenth century reasoning. Article 10,
section 11 provides:
To the end that the public debt of South Carolina may not
hereafter be increased without the due consideration and free
consent of the people of the State, the General Assembly is
hereby forbidden to create any further debt or obligation, either
by the loan of the credit of the State, by guaranty, endorsement
or otherwise, except for the ordinary and current business of the
State, without first submitting the question as to the creation
of such new debt, guaranty, endorsement or loan of its credit to
the qualified electors of this State at a general State election
5
Due to increasing demand for local services, the capital re-
quirements of local government have risen to levels unforeseen by
the authors of the 1895 constitution. In response, the legislature
has developed various techniques to circumvent debt restrictions.
The "special fund" doctrine is one such device. It involves the
issuance of debt securities which are not backed by the full faith
and credit of the State. Since such securities are not obligations
1. 199 S.E.2d 538 (S.C. 1973).
2. 57 Stat. 2237 (1973).
3. Bowman, The Anachronism Called Debt Limitation, 52 IowA L. REv. 863 (1967).
4. Id. at 867.
5. S.C. CONST. art. 10, § 11.
1
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of the State, they are not debts subject to the debt ceiling.' To
qualify a debt under the special fund doctrine, a two prong test
must be met. First, the general faith and credit of the governmen-
tal unit must not be pledged in support of the undertaking; sec-
ond, no specific revenues other than those arising from the im-
provement itself may be pledged. 7
The South Carolina Supreme Court has previously sanc-
tioned the use of the special fund doctrine. In Arthur v. Byrnes'
the court stated:
It is now well settled that the General Assembly may au-
thorize the issuance of general obligations of the State without
submitting the question as to the creation of such debt to the
qualified electors as required by Section 11, Article 10, where
such obligations are secured by the pledge of a fund established
or set aside which is reasonably sufficient to pay such obliga-
tions without resorting to the levy of a property tax.'
In short, an obligation of such character does not constitute a
debt within the contemplation of article 10, section 11.
Act No. 1077 authorized the Budget and Control Board to
issue revenue bonds without an election. The monies raised were
to be disbursed to local units of government to provide them the
necessary matching funds for obtaining maximum federal finan-
cial benefits for the construction of sewage systems. These dis-
bursements in the form of state grants were, in effect, loans by
the State to the local units to be repaid over a long term. Al-
though the full faith and credit of the State was not pledged to
repay the bonds, a bond reserve fund was to be appropriated from
general tax funds. This reserve was to serve as a secondary source
for the retirement of the bonds if the local units' funds proved
inadequate.
6. For example, in People ex rel. Gutnecht v. City of Chicago, 414 Ill. 600, 619, 111
N.E.2d 626, 637-38 (1953), the court stated:
To constitute a debt against a municipality there must be an obligation which
the municipality must, if need be, meet with its funds or property. But if the
obligation is to be paid solely from the income derived from the property pur-
chased with the bonds or their proceeds, no indebtedness is incurred.
7. Bowman, supra note 3, at 877.
8. 244 S.C. 51, 77 S.E.2d 311 (1955).
9. Id. at 57, 77 S.E.2d at 313. The court cited for authority:
State ex rel. Roddey v. Byrnes, 219 S.C. 485, 66 S.E.2d 33 (1951); Arthur v. Johnston,
185 S.C. 324, 194 S.E. 151 (1937); State ex rel. Coleman v. Lewis, 181 S.C. 10, 186 S.E.
625 (1936); Crawford v. Johnston, 177 S.C. 399, 181 S.E. 476 (1935); State ex rel. Richards
v. Moorer, 152 S.C. 455, 150 S.E. 269 (1929).
1974]
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When the local unit received a grant or loan, the Act required
that an assistance agreement be entered into with the State
Budget and Control Board. The agreement would prescribe the
method of repayment by the local unit and the board could re-
quire either the imposition of an ad valorem property tax, a serv-
ice charge, or both to raise the necessary funds.
In Painter v. West, '0 the constitutionality of this Act was
challenged on the grounds that it violated article 10, section 11,
by authorizing the State to incur further debt without an election.
Applying the special fund doctrine, the lower court held that the
Act did not create a debt of the State and that no election -was
required." In reversing the lower court, the supreme court re-
jected the applicability of the doctrine and stated:
Absent in the instant case is an essential prerequisite to the
validity of the bonds under the so-called special fund doctrine,
to-wit; a fund established or set aside which is reasonably suffi-
cient to pay the obligations without resorting to the levy of any
property tax. To the contrary, there is contemplated and specifi-
cally authorized the levy of property taxes, albeit not on a state-
wide basis, to raise in substantial part the primary fund for
retiring bonds which the State proposes to issue."
The court refused to allow circumvention of the election require-
ment by the creation of special districts and levying of a local
property tax. The court observed that the General Assembly
could divide the State into special districts and, in this way,
avoid the election requirement if the Act were declared constitu-
tional. 3
In defending the Act's constitutionality, the attorney general
also argued that the Act created a special assessment and, hence,
did not constitute a property tax within the meaning of article 10,
section 11. Although the funds were to be used to establish a
sewage system enhancing the health and welfare of local units, "
the court found in the following language of section one of the Act
that broader benefits were also envisioned:
[E]fforts have been and are being made at local levels to pro-
vide for the treatment of sewage and other effluent in order that
the streams, rivers and watercourses of the State may be freed
10. 199 S.E.2d 538.
11. Id. at 540.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 540, 541.
14. Id. at 541.
[Vol. 26
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from pollution and in that way hazards to health now existing
be reduced or eliminated .... 15
The court noted that a tax is properly termed an assessment only
when levied solely on the property to be uniquely benefited by
proposed improvements. The tax at issue failed to qualify as an
assessment because:
There is nothing to show that water pollution control, as set
forth in the Act, is such a local improvement as will confer any
special benefit on the property owners in the local units, so as
to justify regarding the ad valorem tax as an assessment for a
benefit conferred.16
The court's decision in Painter may be seen as simply delin-
iating the outer limits of the special fund doctrine. Other deci-
sions dealing with the related doctrine of the "special purpose
district", however, suggest an alternative view. The court has a
history of upholding the constitutionality of bond acts if the
bonds are for beneficial purposes and have been issued in good
faith. For example, the court in Berry v. Milliken,'7 after discuss-
ing the fact that many governmental units had, in real terms,
exceeded their constitutional indebtedness limit, said: "Serious
prejudice would result if they now had to resort to the time con-
suming process of constitutional amendment."18 As in previous
cases, a special purpose district was held not to be bound by the
constitutional limitation. The court did not choose to display
comparable liberality in dealing with the act challenged in
Painter. It is possible that the court was suggesting that the legis-
lature amend the state constitution rather than continue such
efforts to circumvent its provisions. 9 To take advantage of the
available federal funds after Painter, the General Assembly has
passed a new act" which provides for a general obligation of the
State to overcome the constitutional infirmities of the previous
act.
Not all constitutional debt limits, however, apply to the state
15. Id. (emphasis addei).
16. Id. at 542. It should be noted that courts in the past have upheld the special fund
doctrine on the theory that the electoral requirement was intended to protect local prop-
erty owners from excessive taxation. Since the full faith and credit of the state was
pledged, the courts have reasoned that this purpose is fully accomplished.
17. 234 S.C. 518, 109 S.E.2d 354 (1959).
18. Id. at 529, 109 S.E.2d at 359.
19. See generally Bowman, supra note 3.
20. No. 835 [1973] S.C. Acts & JR. Res. 1869.
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government. Some are directed to the indebtedness of local units.
Paralleling methods used on the state level, many techniques
have been developed to circumvent these local debt limitations.
One of the earliest techniques approved by the courts was the
creation of special purpose districts. Such a district is a govern-
mental entity with territory coextensive, in whole or part, with
that of the principle unit. The concept of the special purpose
district relied upon the idea that indebtedness ceilings will be
applied to each governmental entity separately, irrespective of
the fact that they encompass the same geographic area.2
A provision of the South Carolina constitution represents an
attempt to deal with the proliferation of special purpose districts;
where there exists an overlapping of territory between two or more
political subdivisions, each possessing the power to incur debt,
such subdivisions shall exercise that power so that their aggregate
debt will remain under 15% of assessed property value.22 To avoid
this limitation, use of the special assessment has been judicially
allowed in South Carolina. 23 The rationale for the special assess-
ment is that property benefiting from proposed improvements
should bear the cost of the project. To accomplish that end, a
special purpose subdistrict is usually established to administer an
improvement program. Under this approach the municipality
must not be liable on the bonds and the general credit of the city
must not be pledged.24 The creation of a special fund and a special
purpose district thereby avoids the debt limitation.
A recent case involving the special purpose district is Wright
v. Profitt.2 5 There, a sewer subdistrict was created in Greenville
with authorization to issue bonds.21 A taxpayer challenged the
constitutionality of the statute creating the district and the issu-
ing of bonds for which he would be required to pay ad valorem
taxes. The sewer commission planned to build sewers in ten of the
more heavily populated areas in the subdistrict over a five year
21. Bowers, Limitations on Municiple Indebtedness, 5 VAND. L. REv. 37 (1952).
22. S.C. CONST. art. X, § 5. As in the case of constitutional limits on State debt,
courts have been, for the most part, very liberal in interpreting limits on local units when
they conflict with projects that have a beneficial purpose. See, e.g., Berry v. Milliken, 234
S.C. 518, 109 S.E.2d 354 (1973), where the South Carolina Supreme Court, in the face of
the 15% limit, allowed aggregation above that amount. For a discussion of how judicial
liberality can weaken such provisions, see generally Bowers, supra note 21, at 46.
23. E.g., Mills Mill v. Hawkins, 232 S.C. 515, 103 S.E.2d 14 (1957).
24. See Kansas City v. Ward, 134 Mo. 172, 35 S.W. 600 (1896).
25. 261 S.C. 68, 198 S.E.2d 275 (1973).
26. No. 687 [19691 S.C. Acts & Jt. Res. 1301.
[Vol. 26
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period. The completed sewer lines would not reach the homes of
the taxpayer and others living in rural areas of the district. Never-
theless, the taxpayer would have been required to pay the ad
valorem tax to help finance the bonds. He claimed that this
would result in an assessment without a benefit and, therefore,
constitute both a taking of his property without due process and
a denial of equal protection.
Relying heavily on Mills Mill v. Hawkins,27 the supreme
court found in favor of the subdistrict, citing the rule in this
jurisdiction that benefits accruing to property need not be direct
or immediate in order to justify an assessment. Here the taxpayer
would benefit in having a sewer line nearer his property and in
the improved conditions of sanitation and health throughout the
area. The court also responded to the taxpayer's contention that
construction might stop after the initial phase, which was thir-
teen miles from his home, by stating: "The presumption is that
the Commission will perform its duty.. . . . Mere speculation
that it may not do so is insufficient to entitle plaintiff to relief
on constitutional grounds.
'2
The goal of attaining a sound fiscal policy provided the origi-
nal motivation for indebtedness limitations. 29 It has been seen
that such limits are easily avoided, and it is questionable whether
they should be retained. It would seem that a responsible govern-
ing body could be entrusted to make decisions regarding borrow-
ing without the debt limit serving as a "Sword of Damocles"
inhibiting its exercise of discretion.30
I1. COUNTY AND MUNICIPAL AFFAIRS
In 1966, the South Carolina General Assembly created the
Committee to study the Constitution of 1895. The committee's
report submitted an entirely new constitution, but recommended
against the convention procedure and instead advised that a
method be used whereby the new constitution could be submitted
on an article by article basis to the electorate. 31 Consequently, a
27. 232 S.C. 515, 103 S.E.2d 14 (1957). For an interesting analysis of this case see
Toal, Edens: The Prime Obstacle To a Redevelopment of South Carolina Water Law, 23
S.C.L. Rav. 63, 67-70 (1971).
28. 261 S.C. at 74, 198 S.E.2d at 278.
29. See Bowman, supra note 3.
30. Id. at 898.
31. See Neel v. Shealey, 199 SE.2d 542, 544 (S.C. 1973).
1974]
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new article VII[ was submitted and ratified on March 7, 1973.32
It is contemplated that an entirely new constitution will be cre-
ated in a similar manner.Y
The new article VIII, originally intended as part of a com-
pletely new constitution, failed to specify a date when it was to
become effective. In Neel v. Shealey,34 the supreme court held in
a per curiam opinion that the provisions of the new article VIII
are to apply prospectively in their operation from March 7, 197331
and, therefore, upheld a challenged hospital bond act for New-
berry County.
In Neel, taxpayers had challenged the hospital bond on a
theory based on the interrelation of sections 1 and 7 of the new
article VIII. Section 7 prohibits the enactment of "special legisla-
tion" while section 1 states:
The powers possessed by all counties, cities, towns and
other political subdivisions at the effective date of this
Constitution shall continue until changed in a manner provided
by law."
Reading these two sections together, the challengers argued that
all special legislation enacted between the effective date of the
1895 constitution (to which the new article VIII is an amendment)
and March 7, 1973, the ratification date of the new article VIII,
is unconstitutional. Therefore, they asked that the hospital bond,
which was authorized under such special legislation, be declared
unconstitutional.
The court thought it obvious that the language in section 1
was retained in the final version of article VIII as a result of poor
draftsmanship, since the authors initially intended that an en-
tirely new constitution be presented.37 The court had little trouble
finding a basis for its decision in other sections of the article.
Particularly, the court pointed to the provision in section 7 which
provides that five alternative forms of government be estab-
lished,3" finding itself "unable to glean any intention other than
of a prospective application of this provision. '"" Noting the clear
32. Id, at 545.
33. Id. at 544.
34. 199 S.E.2d 542 (S.C. 1973).
35. Id. at 547.
36. S.C. CONST. art. 8, § 1 (emphasis added).
37. 199 S.E.2d at 546-47.
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intent of the drafters and the rule that "a statute will never be
given such a [retroactive] construction, unless it is required by
the express words of the statute. ,, the court concluded that
the new article VIII "speak[s] from the occasion of its ratifica-
tion rather than the effective date of the 1895 Constitution."'"
WILLIAM W. WATKINS
40. Id. at 545, quoting Curtis v. Renneker, 34 S.C. 468, 13 S.E. 664 (1891).
41. Id. at 547.
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